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The Pragmatic Limits of
Access to Justice
Hart Schwartz & Anthony Robert Sangiuliano*

I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of Canada’s Charter1 jurisprudence often resembles
a seesaw. The Court will tilt toward a robust approach that favours
individual rights and freedoms only to adjust a short time later when the
broader social or economic costs of its expansive jurisprudence become
evident. Expansion is followed by contraction. Whether this pattern is
best described in terms of “trimming its sails”,2 taking corrective measures,
or simply clarifying doctrinal scope, the Court has teetered to one side
and tottered back again on a number of occasions.
The concept of “access to justice” is one example. In 2014 it had been
constitutionalized as a basic principle of the rule of law that can
invalidate legislation. 2015 brought a corrective contraction. The Court
demonstrated an awareness of the broader detrimental impact caused by
too great an expansion. In R. v. Kokopenace3 and Henry v. British Columbia
(Attorney General),4 it recalibrated, taking a pragmatic, realistic and
practical approach.

*
Counsel and Student-at-Law respectively, Constitutional Law Branch, Ministry of the
Attorney General of Ontario. The views expressed herein are solely those of the authors and do not
purport to represent the position of the Attorney General or her Ministry. Hart Schwartz was counsel
for Ontario in the Henry v. British Columbia (Attorney General) appeal at the Supreme Court of
Canada.
1
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
2
See, e.g., Thomson Irvine, “Changing Course or Trimming Sails? The Supreme Court
Reconsiders” in David A. Wright & Adam M. Dodek, eds., Public Law at the McLachlin Court: The
First Decade (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2011), at 9.
3
[2015] S.C.J. No. 28, 2015 SCC 28 (S.C.C.), revg [2013] O.J. No. 2752 (Ont. C.A.)
[hereinafter “Kokopenace”].
4
[2015] S.C.J. No. 24, 2015 SCC 24 (S.C.C.), revg [2014] B.C.J. No. 71 (B.C.C.A.)
[hereinafter “Henry”].
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In contemporary legal discourse, access to justice is equated with
using the law as an instrument to achieve desirable social goals (such as
ameliorating the estrangement of disadvantaged groups from the justice
system or compensating those whose Charter rights have been violated).
“Justice”, under this conception, is defined by reference to the moral
ends to be achieved through the tool of law; and the law is evaluated as
just to the extent that it achieves these ends. By contrast, Kokopenace
and Henry demonstrate the Court’s commitment to a subtler and more
nuanced conception of access to justice. Its focus is not just on the moral
goals to be achieved, but on the pragmatic and realistic capacity of the
actors that operate the legal system on a day-to-day basis to ensure that
the justice system, in the first place, can actually function to achieve any
goals at all. Ultimately, it is a uniquely Canadian commitment because it
recognizes the potential difficulties associated with sacrificing the law’s
workability for the Canadian populace as a whole in order to achieve
social justice for one particular cohort of citizens.
Those who interpret access to justice in terms of using law to achieve
social justice may criticize Kokopenace and Henry as missed opportunities.5
However even on an instrumental conception of law, there is still much
to endorse in these decisions. In Part II, we analyze the expansion of
access to justice in the Court’s recent jurisprudence. In Part III, we
unpack the concept of access to justice. We argue that a prevalent
conception of access to justice is one that views the legal system as a tool
to achieve social justice. Furthermore, an instrumental conception of
access to justice must preserve those practical elements that allow the
legal system to actually function in the first place. These elements must
be preserved to ensure the system’s efficacy as a tool to achieve any
ends at all for Canadian society as a whole. In Part IV, we argue that the
Court’s reasons in Kokopenace and Henry embrace such a commitment
in the course of retracting the expansion of access to justice that can be
discerned in its past decisions. We resist the conclusion that Kokopenace
and Henry are flawed because they fail to promote access to social
justice.

See e.g., Rosemary Cairns Way, “An Opportunity for Equality: Kokopenace and Nur at
the Supreme Court of Canada” (2014) 61 Crim. L.Q. 465, at 475-77; Myles Frederick McLennan,
“Innocence Compensation: the Private, Public and Prerogative Remedies” (2014) 45 Ottawa L. Rev.
59, at 78-84.
5
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II. THE EXPANSION OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN
2013 AND 2014
In its 2013 decision in AIC Limited v. Fischer6 the Court emphasized
that the determination of when class actions are preferable must be
assessed from the point of view of providing access to justice.7 Justice
Cromwell defined this concept as follows:
… It has two dimensions, which are interconnected. One focuses on
process and is concerned with whether the claimants have access to a
fair process to resolve their claims. The other focuses on substance —
the results to be obtained — and is concerned with whether the
claimants will receive a just and effective remedy for their claims if
established.8

In Fischer, the Court did not appear to have intended to construct
something like a basic right of access to justice that can supersede
statutes or other government measures. Even the substantive dimension
of access to justice was invoked only for the procedural purpose of
concluding that the class action in Fischer should be certified because it
potentially offered “just compensation for the class members’ individual
economic claims should they be established”.9 Yet, one can imagine how
a litigant’s interest in accessing a just and effective remedy might enable
him or her to challenge barriers that deny her such a remedy, such as high
legal thresholds for establishing state liability or the composition of the
decision-making body adjudicating her claim.
Hryniak v. Mauldin10 dealt with the proper interpretation of statutory
rules governing summary judgment. The Court stated that “[e]nsuring
access to justice is the greatest challenge to the rule of law in Canada
today.”11 But its articulation of access to justice was primarily procedural;
it focused on fair and just processes of adjudication and emphasized the
efficient use of court resources, affordability and expeditiousness. Justice
Karakatsanis encouraged a “shift in culture” away from the trial process as
the traditional method of dispute resolution. She wrote that litigants have
as their goal partaking in “a fair process that results in a just adjudication

6
7
8
9
10
11

[2013] S.C.J. No. 69, 2013 SCC 69 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Fischer”].
Id., at para. 3.
Id., at para. 24.
Id., at para. 50.
[2014] S.C.J. No. 7, 2014 SCC 7 (S.C.C.).
Id., at para. 1.
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of disputes” but that this process is “illusory unless it is also accessible”.12
Again, despite these acclamatory remarks, no power to override legislative
provision appears to have been contemplated.
In 2014, Trial Lawyers Association of British Columbia v. British
Columbia (Attorney General)13 represented the most dramatic development
in the Court’s understanding of access to justice. The Court elaborated a
very strong conception of access to justice that closely resembles a
constitutional right by drawing on the unwritten constitutional principle
of the rule of law and the core powers of provincial superior courts under
section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867.14 At issue were court hearing
fees, payable by the party that brought the proceeding, imposed by the
province of British Columbia. The trial court could waive them where
the litigant was on social assistance or “otherwise impoverished”.
In finding that the fees were unconstitutional, the majority used
language that, while not directly establishing a constitutional “right” of
access to justice, comes awfully close. Building on the proposition that
the rule of law protects access to the courts, the majority stated:
… As access to justice is fundamental to the rule of law, and the rule
of law is fostered by the continued existence of the s. 96 courts, it is
only natural that s. 96 provide some degree of constitutional protection
for access to justice.15

The advent of “some degree of constitutional protection” was met
with alarm in Rothstein J.’s dissent. His Honour decried the possible
impact of creating a new entrenched right from the unwritten principle of
the rule of law and permitting it to invalidate legislation. He approved
of the claim that “[a]dvocates tend to read into the principle of the rule of
law anything which supports their particular view of what the law should
be.”16 He stated that to permit “this nebulous principle to invalidate
legislation based on its content introduces uncertainty into constitutional
law and undermines our system of positive law.”17
Trial Lawyers represents the high-water mark, to date, in recognizing
access to justice as a constitutionally protected interest. Using access to
justice to strike down legislation has far-reaching implications. This new
12
13
14
15
16
17

Id., at para. 28.
[2014] S.C.J. No 59, 2014 SCC 59 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Trial Lawyers”].
(U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3.
Id., at para. 39 (emphasis added).
Id., at para. 102.
Id.
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power could be relied on to inform, and potentially expand, individual
rights.18 For example, the high threshold in tort law for establishing
prosecutorial misconduct had long been viewed as hindering access to
justice for individuals seeking compensation for violations of their
Charter rights. Official conduct in remote communities resulting in no
Aboriginal persons sitting on juries of Aboriginal offenders had also
been characterized as engaging access to justice for members of that
community. Here, too, there was new potential for challenging what had,
in the main, been a somewhat “hands off” approach to the fragile issue of
jury selection.
Each of these issues arose in 2015. Yet, despite the constitutional
recognition of access to justice as part of the rule of law, the pendulum
swung in the other direction. Instead of a continual expansion, the Court
embraced realism and practicality. In doing so, it reflected a commitment
to a pragmatic and uniquely Canadian understanding of “access to
justice”. We turn to that discussion next.

III. THE IDEA OF ACCESS TO JUSTICE
1. The Instrumental Conception of Access to Justice
Although it is common to speak of the need to promote “access to
justice”, the meaning of this thought is not always clear. The Court
offered guidance in Hryniak and Trial Lawyers, defining it in terms of
access to fair and just processes of adjudication of civil disputes.
But participants in contemporary legal discourse often have in mind a
more robust conception. This was identified in Fischer as the substantive
dimension of access to justice. It is based on the extent to which there is
improvement in social conditions. It demands “access to social justice”.
As put by Trevor Farrow,
… access to justice is for the most part understood as access to the kind
of life — and the kinds of communities in which — people would like
to live. It is about accessing equality, understanding, education, food,
housing, security, happiness, et cetera. It is about the good life; that is

18
See e.g., C. Tess Sheldon, Karen R. Spector & Mercedez Perez, “Re-Centering Equality:
The Interplay between Sections 7 and 15 of the Charter in Challenges to Psychiatric Detention”
(2016) 35 N.J.C.L. 193, at 218-23.
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ultimately the point … Good laws, rules, judges, educators, lawyers,
and courtrooms are all important. However, these are not ends in
themselves, but rather steps along the path to justice and access to it.19

An instrumental conception of access to social justice — although not
without its detractors20 — has deep roots in legal theory. It parallels
Bentham’s utilitarian account of the nature of law, according to which all
government acts ought to promote maximum happiness for members of
the social community over which the government has influence.21 For
Bentham, law is a tool that operates by getting people to do what is good.
The good is specified independently of law because it is possible, in
principle, for it to be realized without law. It is simply that government
should use law to bring the good about. This account also parallels legal
realist theories, which maintain that judges do, and should, adjudicate by
rendering the decision that best achieves the most desirable social policy.22
Instrumentalism also figures in prevalent views about law reform.
Patricia Hughes argues that law reform commissions’ recommendations
will improve the law and enhance access to justice if they incorporate
non-legal perspectives on justice, that is, “external bodies of knowledge
and methods of analysis … that recognize that law is ‘in the world’”.23
Access to justice requires us to make it easier for people to participate in
the legal system by eliminating impediments to legal justice that are
imposed by social and economic disadvantage.24 The commissions must
“enter the non-legal realm, which is the place where justice can be
realized”, so that their recommendations reflect “experiential and
academic knowledge from outside the world of law”.25
Finally, a prominent ambition of legal education is to instruct students
on how to use their newly acquired skills to make the world a better
place upon graduation. The dean of Cornell Law School once observed
that it was part of “the ordinary religion of the law school classroom”
19
Trevor C.W. Farrow, “What is Access to Justice?” (2014) 51 Osgoode Hall L.J. 957, at
983 (emphasis added). See also Alice Woolley & Trevor Farrow, “Addressing Access to Justice
Through New Legal Service Providers: Opportunities and Challenges” (2016) 3 Tex. A&M L. Rev. 549,
at 555-556.
20
See, e.g., Brian Z. Tamanaha, “How an Instrumental View of Law Corrodes the Rule of
Law” (2007) 56 DePaul L. Rev. 569.
21
See David Lyons, In the Interest of the Governed: A Study in Bentham’s Philosophy of
Utility and Law, revised ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), at 27-33.
22
See Hanoch Dagan, “The Realist Conception of Law” (2007) 57 U.T.L.J. 607, at 631-37.
23
Patricia Hughes, “Law Commissions and Access to Justice: What Justice Should We Be
Talking About?” (2008) 46 Osgoode Hall L.J. 773, at 776.
24
Id., at 777-81.
25
Id., at 782.
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that “law is an instrument for achieving social goals … a means to an
end … to be appraised only in light of the ends it achieves.”26 The
pedagogical spirit of Osgoode Hall Law School has been described as
“committed to exploring law as an instrument of social change and social
justice”.27
The instrumental conception of law thus provides a satisfactory
starting point for expressing the meaning of access to justice. What are
its implications for critiquing legal rules and judicial decisions? Joseph
Raz explored this question in developing his theory of the rule of law.28
Raz views law as a tool to achieve desirable ends. It “is not just a fact of
life”, and, although it can and has been used to serve evil purposes, it “is
a form of social organization which should be used properly and for the
proper ends”.29 It achieves its purposes by guiding the conduct of those
subject to it and directing subjects to behave in ways that bring about
law’s purposes.30 Raz argues that there must be an inherent virtue to law:
It must be capable of guiding its subjects. If the law is not capable of
guiding its subjects, it cannot direct them to behave in the ways needed
to achieve its ends, no matter what its ends may be, and it will be a
defective tool for achieving its purposes, just as a dull knife is defective
because it is not suited to achieve its goals. The ability to effectively
guide subjects is the “specific excellence of law” and is “a necessary
condition for the law to be serving directly any good purpose at all”.31
The law must be prospective, public and clear, and judicial and executive
officials must implement it consistently. If it is retrospective, clandestine,
vague and applied arbitrarily, it will be difficult for citizens to look to it
for guidance when deciding how to act.32
But Raz’s explanation of law’s internal virtues on an instrumental
conception leaves out one important requirement — a requirement of
pragmatism, efficiency, and operability. If law is to function as an
excellent tool for achieving its purposes, not only must legal rules guide
subjects, but also the actors and institutions that drive the everyday
26
Roger C. Cramton, “The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom” (1978) 29 J.
Legal Educ. 29, at 250.
27
Marilyn L. Pilkington, “Parkdale Community Legal Services: An Investment in Legal
Education” (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 420, at 421.
28
Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1979), c. 11.
29
Id., at 225-26.
30
Id., at 213-14, 224-25.
31
Id., at 225.
32
Id., at 214-19.
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machinery of the legal system must be able to effectively do so.
Inefficiencies can cause the legal system to grind to a halt altogether. The
law then becomes defective because it is rendered incapable of fulfilling
any purpose at all.
Thus, the key actors that keep the legal system moving — lawyers,
judges, prosecutors, police officers, juries and administrative agents —
must not have their abilities to do their jobs hampered to the point that
the system is disabled from functioning. By analogy, if an assembly line
worker is not given the required part to install, the line’s operation cannot
succeed. The line also cannot move so fast as to give the worker
inadequate time to install the correct part properly. The effect will be the
collapse of the line as a tool designed to achieve a particular goal.
An instrumental conception of law may offer a perspective from
which to appraise a legal rule based on the degree to which it achieves a
given laudable social goal. Yet, it must also countenance a rule that
safeguards the capacity for the actors in a legal system to function
pragmatically on a day-to-day basis.
2. Collective Values in Canadian Political and Constitutional
Culture
It might be argued that some ends that law can be designed to achieve
are so socially desirable that in order to realize them, even drastic
reductions in efficiency are tolerable. But it is important to also bear in
mind the nature of law’s inherent virtue of efficiency. A virtuous legal
system speaks “in the name of the whole society and address matters of
concern to society as such”.33 Pragmatic operability is a systemic virtue
of law on an instrumental conception. It makes the law an excellent tool
to realize the social goals of its community as a unified people, rather
than just the interests of singular individuals. Inefficiency is a systemic
vice. It makes a legal system deficient when it comes to effectively
serving both individual citizens and the community as a whole. Hence,
any reduction in a legal system’s operability, even one that achieves a
morally worthy social end for a particular disadvantaged social cohort, is
accompanied by a reduction in the law’s virtue as a communal tool
designed to achieve important collective goals. And such a trade-off is

33
Jeremy Waldron, “The Rule of Law and the Importance of Procedure” in James E.
Fleming, ed., Getting to the Rule of Law (New York: New York University Press, 2011) 3, at 31.
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often intolerable if the law is to remain an excellent instrument to
achieve justice for the community.
This view of the relationship between individual and communal
interests is a uniquely Canadian one. A venerable tradition in political
science and sociological scholarship discerns a “collectivity-oriented”34
ethos in Canadian political culture that contrasts with the individualistic
ethos of American political culture. Canadian political culture has been
described as exhibiting a “corporate-organic-collectivist”35 ideology
that regards Canadians as more willing than Americans to “justify the
restraint of the individual in the interests of the community as a whole”.36
The American ethos perceives of social life in terms of an “agglomeration
of atomistic individuals”,37 each employing his or her industriousness to
compete for achievement and social status from initial positions of equal
opportunity. It rejects a posture of deference to social order by the
citizenry and sees minimal state regulation of the market as necessary to
protect individual freedom.38 Canadians, on the other hand, are more
likely to identify their own interests with transcendent interests of the
community in social order and good government out of a sense of civic
attachment or belonging to the community. They endorse greater state
intervention in controlling economic conditions to bring about collective
ends, such as equality of condition, even at the expense of individual
freedoms.39
The distinctively Canadian view of the relationship between individual
and communal values is discernible in our nation’s constitutional culture
as well. Perhaps most importantly, section 1 of the Charter exemplifies
the importance in Canadian constitutional discourse of collective values.
A persistent theme of the Charter jurisprudence interpreting this provision
is a firm recognition that collective values can narrow the scope of
individual rights.
In the foundational section 1 case of Oakes, Dickson C.J.C. expressed
this point powerfully, writing that “[i]t may become necessary to limit
rights and freedoms in circumstances where their exercise would be
34
Seymour Martin Lipset, “Historical Traditions and National Characteristics: A Comparative
Analysis of Canada and the United States” (1986) 11 Can. J. Soc. 113, at 114 [hereinafter “Lipset”].
35
G. Horowitz, “Conservatism, Liberalism, and Socialism in Canada: An Interpretation”
(1966) 32 Can. J. Econ. & Pol. Sci. 143, at 144.
36
Nelson Wiseman, In Search of Canadian Political Culture (Vancouver: University of
British Columbia Press, 2007), at 21 [hereinafter “Wiseman”].
37
Id., at 22.
38
Lipset, supra, note 34, at 114.
39
See Wiseman, supra, note 36, at 23.
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inimical to the realization of collective goals of fundamental importance.”40
He reiterated it in his subsequent opinion in R. v. Edwards Books and Art
Ltd.41 In upholding Ontario’s Sunday closing legislation on the ground
that it provided a community-wide “pause day”, he paid heed to a
“collective goal of fundamental importance” by adopting the following
remarks of the Ontario Law Reform Commission:
Thus while our productive capacity and economic standard of living
continue to increase in Ontario, our collective opportunity for the more
intangible benefits of participation in leisure activities together with
family, friends and others in society continues to decrease. It is in the
light of this continuing erosion of statutory holidays and evening hours
that we consider it absolutely essential that the government now
attempt to preserve at least one uniform day each week as a pause day,
before it is too late.42

The “collective opportunity for more intangible benefits” of
participation in the community exemplifies Canada’s collectivity-oriented
ethos. Chief Justice Dickson emphasized the importance of developing
the self’s authenticity through group participation:
… A family visit to an uncle or a grandmother, the attendance of a
parent at a child’s sports tournament, a picnic, a swim, or a hike in the
park on a summer day, or a family expedition to a zoo, circus, or
exhibition — these, and hundreds of other leisure activities with family
and friends are amongst the simplest but most profound joys that any of
us can know. The aim of protecting workers, families and communities
from a diminution of opportunity to experience the fulfilment offered
by these activities, and from the alienation of the individual from his or
her closest social bonds, is not one which I regard as unimportant or
trivial. In the context of the “fast-growing trend toward wide-scale store
openings”, I am satisfied that the Act is aimed at a pressing and
substantial concern. It therefore survives the first part of the inquiry
under s. 1.43

R. v. Keegstra44 also illustrates the orientation towards communal
belonging in Canadian constitutional culture. The Court held that hate
speech is harmful and in need of suppression because of the way in
40
R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, at 136 (S.C.C.), affg [1983] O.J.
No. 2501 (Ont. C.A.) (emphasis added).
41
[1986] S.C.J. No. 70, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 (S.C.C.), varg [1984] O.J. No. 3379 (Ont. C.A.).
42
Id., at para. 120 (emphasis added, original emphasis removed).
43
Id., at para. 121 (emphasis added).
44
[1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (S.C.C.), revg [1988] A.J. No. 501 (Alta. C.A.).
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which it severs the targeted individual’s attachment to the community
and thereby interferes with the development of his or her self-respect:
A person’s sense of human dignity and belonging to the community at
large is closely linked to the concern and respect accorded the groups
to which he or she belongs (see I. Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty”,
in Four Essays on Liberty (1969), 118, at p. 155). The derision,
hostility and abuse encouraged by hate propaganda therefore have a
severely negative impact on the individual’s sense of self-worth and
acceptance. This impact may cause target group members to take
drastic measures in reaction, perhaps avoiding activities which bring
them into contact with non-group members or adopting attitudes and
postures directed towards blending in with the majority.45

These comments reveal that, in Canadian constitutional culture, there
is a basic concern that citizens not become alienated, or not subjected to
a situation in which they are detached from the very social group or
community that gives their lives meaning and definition.46 The legal
system’s efficient operation enables it to function as an effective
instrument to achieve desirable goals for the whole community that it is
meant to serve. Next, we will explain how this idea animated the 2015
decisions in Kokopenace and Henry.

IV. ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN KOKOPENACE AND HENRY
1. R. v. Kokopenace
Justice Moldaver’s majority opinion in Kokopenace demonstrates a
pragmatic understanding of the effect of too broad an expansion of section 11
Charter rights on the actual workings of the criminal justice system. To
require the state to do more to increase the representation on the jury roll
of members of marginalized Aboriginal groups would have imposed
something close to a positive obligation to address long-standing social
and historical conditions that have led to poverty and alienation. While this
remedial obligation may have advanced social justice, it also would have
had negative practical consequences. It would impair the ability of
45

Id., at 746-47 (emphasis added).
Cf. Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1982), at 148-50; Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition” in Amy Gutmann,
ed., Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1994) 25, at 31-34.
46
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the Crown to proceed with serious criminal prosecutions. It would
disproportionately reallocate scarce resources throughout the court system.
The dissent reflects a more idealistic approach to the use of law to achieve
social justice. The declaration proposed by the dissent would have imposed
significant novel — and somewhat undefined — obligations on the Crown
to address the disengagement from the criminal justice system that is
widespread amongst Aboriginal peoples.
Mr. Kokopenace was charged with second-degree murder following a
fight in which his friend was stabbed to death. His trial was held before a
judge and jury in Kenora, Ontario. Kenora is a small town in the
southwest corner of the province, but the District of Kenora is enormous
and contains a large number of reserves, which are associated with
approximately 46 different First Nations. The on-reserve adult population
makes up between 21 to 32 per cent of the total adult population. No
challenge was brought at the outset of the trial to the jury. However, after
conviction for manslaughter, but before sentencing, Mr. Kokopenace’s
counsel learned of problems with the inclusion on the jury roll of
Aboriginal persons that reside on reserves. He sought a mistrial, which
was denied. This issue was raised on appeal and a divided Ontario Court
of Appeal granted the appeal and ordered a new trial.
Jury selection in Ontario involves a series of steps. It begins with
reliance on a “source list” which, it is hoped, should contain the names of
all persons in Ontario that might be available for jury duty. While some
provinces use health card information (because almost every resident has
one), and while some American jurisdictions use voting lists, Ontario has
relied on the information in municipal property tax rolls, which is
supposed to enumerate the name and address of residents. However,
because property on a reserve is not individually owned and no
municipal tax is paid, Ontario legislation permits the sheriff to obtain the
names of inhabitants of the reserve “from any record available”.
Names from that source list are then randomly selected based on the
number of jury notices that it is anticipated will be needed for the next
sitting of the trial court. Those selected then have a jury questionnaire
sent to them. If the questionnaire is returned, and the person is eligible,
then he or she is placed on the jury roll for that sitting.
When a jury trial is about to commence, a second round of random
selection occurs. This time, names from the jury roll are randomly
picked. Those chosen receive a jury notice requiring their attendance in
the courtroom. These individuals make up the array or jury panel.
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A third round of random selection then occurs in the courtroom itself.
The names of those sitting on the array are drawn and the individual
comes forward to the front of the court. If the person is not rejected by
counsel, the judge, or through the challenge-for-cause process, he or
she will be one of the 12-member petit jury that actually serves on a
particular trial.
The Court of Appeal’s main findings demonstrated that on-reserve
Aboriginal residents were not even making it on to the source list, let
alone the jury roll, jury panel, or the petit jury. One reason for this
outcome was a strong reluctance on the part of the Aboriginal bands or
members of reserve communities to provide a list of names of residents.
Even when such a list was provided and the jury questionnaire was
mailed out, these questionnaires would not be returned. And, even if
returned, and a resident subsequently received a jury notice very often he
or she would not attend court. All members of the Supreme Court
recognized that a reason for this poor response were well-known
historical, cultural, and social factors that resulted in Aboriginal peoples’
general disengagement from the mainstream justice system.
The divergent opinions in the Supreme Court ruling reflect differing
views on the practical limits of an instrumental conception of access to
justice. The need to use the law to advance social justice is evident
throughout the minority’s opinion. Justice Cromwell would have
imposed an obligation on the part of the state to make “reasonable
efforts” to address the poor return rate for prospective Aboriginal jurors.
This obligation would have included active monitoring of the return rates
from the reserves and strongly encouraging responses.47 But even more
remarkably, Cromwell J. also held that the province had to also take steps
to reduce the prevalent Aboriginal disengagement, including addressing
the presence and prevalence of deep-rooted, systemic racial discrimination
against Aboriginal persons in society.48
Justice Cromwell did not prescribe what precise steps the state would
have been obligated to take to address deeply entrenched systemic
problems. However, solve them it must. In a passage that invited
trenchant criticism from the majority, he wrote that the outcome that
the Crown must achieve for both source lists and jury rolls is one where

47
48

Kokopenace, supra, note 3, at para. 274.
Id., at paras. 281, 286.
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on-reserve Aboriginal representation is “substantially similar” to the
distribution of that group in the District of Kenora.49
The majority’s response reflected a pragmatic and realistic approach
to access to justice and took into account the needs of the broader
community. Justice Moldaver was writing in a context, following the
Court of Appeal’s decision in Kokopenace, in which at least one jury trial
of an Aboriginal offender was suspended by the trial judge and could
not be held until the province of Ontario took reasonable steps to
create a representative jury roll.50 The social cost alone of having the
administration of criminal justice grind to a hold and being unable to try
offenders is high. Furthermore, the requirement to take positive steps to
address broad social problems also exacts a high cost and takes scarce
judicial resources away from other parts of the criminal justice system.
Finally, the criminal justice system is a blunt instrument to try to right
historical wrongs visited on Aboriginal persons and communities.
As Moldaver J. wrote:
… I cannot accept Cromwell J.’s suggestion that the state must actively
encourage responses or that, to this end, the state is obliged to address
the distressing history of estrangement and discrimination suffered by
Aboriginal peoples. There are good reasons why the state’s
representativeness obligation does not rise to this level and only
requires a fair opportunity for participation. Efforts to address historical
and systemic wrongs against Aboriginal peoples — although socially
laudable — are by definition an attempt to target a particular group for
inclusion on the jury roll. Requiring the state to target a particular
group for inclusion would be a radical departure from the way the
Canadian jury selection process has always been understood.
In coming to this conclusion, I am in no way suggesting that the state
should not take action on this pressing social problem. However, an
accused’s representativeness right is not the appropriate vehicle for this
task. This right is held by the accused, not by societal groups. And,
because the focus of representativeness is on the process, not the
results, the state’s constitutional obligation is satisfied by providing a
fair opportunity to participate — even if part of the population declines
to do so.51

49
50
51

Id., at paras. 246-247.
R. v. B. (S.), [2014] O.J. No. 2469, 2014 ONSC 2394 (Ont. S.C.J.).
Kokopenace, supra, note 3, at paras. 64-65.
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In addition, the dissent’s attempt to advance the social justice objective
of having source lists and jury rolls achieve “substantially similar”
representativeness of Aboriginal peoples would have radically altered the
Canadian criminal justice system. To find out if a potential juror is
Aboriginal, inquiries must be made as to their race. This significantly
erodes juror privacy. In the United States, such information is routinely
required. It has been regarded as anathema in Canada. Rather, there has
been a powerful theme of respecting juror privacy as much as possible.52
The social justice goal of mandating proportionate representation has
at its core a presumption that a non-Aboriginal juror has a bias, perhaps
an unconscious or subtle bias of which he or she is unaware, but a bias
nonetheless.53 But, to adopt the assumption of unconscious bias would be
to turn the Canadian approach to jury selection on its head. We would
need to adopt an American approach where “every candidate for jury
duty may be challenged and questioned as to preconceptions and
prejudices.”54 That approach “treats all members of the jury pool as
presumptively suspect”.55 But the Canadian system has always operated
under the opposite assumption, i.e., that Canadian jurors are impartial.
That presumption can only be displaced where it is “clear and obvious”
that the person is partial or where there exists a “realistic potential” for
juror partiality.56
The dissent’s approach in Kokopenace, at the end of the day, adopts
an unconscious, but no less invidious, form of stereotyping. To assume
that a person who is part of a distinct group brings a particular
perspective leaves little room for individual autonomy, the power of
rationality, and the ability to change one’s perspective through the jury’s
deliberative process. As the English Court of Appeal recognized “there is
no principle that a jury should be racially balanced”, for this “would
depend on an underlying premise that jurors of a particular racial origin
52

R. v. Yumnu, [2012] S.C.J. No. 73, 2012 SCC 73, at paras. 41-42 (S.C.C.), affg [2010]
O.J. No. 4163 (Ont. C.A.). See also R. v. Find, [2001] S.C.J. No. 34, 2001 SCC 32, at para. 26
(S.C.C.), affg [1999] O.J. No. 3295 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Find”]. For this section, we’re
indebted to the Crown’s February 27, 2014 Kokopenace factum by Gillian Roberts and Deborah
Calderwood.
53
In Kokopenace, Justice Moldaver correctly noted that “there is no empirical data to
support the proposition that jurors of the same race as the accused are necessary to evaluate the
evidence in a fair and impartial manner.” Kokopenace, supra, note 3, at para. 52.
54
R. v. Williams, [1998] S.C.J. No. 49, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128, at paras. 12-13 (S.C.C.), revg
[1996] B.C.J. No. 926 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Williams”].
55
Find, supra, note 52, at para. 26.
56
Id., at paras. 26, 30-34. See also Williams, supra, note 54, at para. 57.
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or holding particular religious beliefs are incapable of giving an impartial
verdict in accordance with the evidence”.57
2. Henry v. British Columbia (Attorney General)
In a perfect world, the prosecutor in a criminal trial would not make
mistakes, get tired, cut corners, or make dumb decisions. The Supreme
Court’s decision in Henry58 turned on two very different views of the
everyday, real-life work of an Assistant Crown Attorney. Once again, the
majority adopted a pragmatic approach and refused to impose a low
threshold for establishing liability for misconduct, which would have
seriously hindered Crown counsel in carrying out his or her duties. By
contrast, the dissent would have imposed no misconduct threshold at all.
A plaintiff need only establish causation, i.e., that prosecutorial conduct
resulted in a breach, in order to become entitled to damages. Here, too,
although the dissent’s approach would have markedly advanced access to
social justice for claimants, particularly those alleging wrongful
conviction due to prosecutorial misconduct, it would have had a negative
impact on the criminal justice system as a whole.
In tort law, the policy rationale underlying the need to protect nonmalicious prosecutorial conduct from private or public damage claims
was set out in Nelles v. Ontario.59 It was necessary to require a high
threshold of misconduct in order to: ensure that Crown Attorneys are not
hindered in the proper execution of their important public duties; deter
any inhibiting effect on the discharge by a Crown Attorney of his or her
central function of prosecuting crime; avoid damage to the public trust of
the prosecutor’s office; avoid a defensive approach by prosecutors to
their multifarious duties to protect themselves from potential damage
claims; and eliminate the need for prosecutors to become diverted from
the pressing duty of enforcing the criminal law by spending valuable
time and using scarce resources to prevent or respond to lawsuits.60
57
R. v. Ford, [1989] Crim. L.R. 828, 3 All E.R. 445, at 448-50 (C.A.). For a summary of
commonwealth approaches to representativeness, see R. v. Ellis, [2011] N.Z.C.A. 90, [2011] B.C.L.
327, at paras. 42-60 (N.Z.C.A.).
58
Henry, supra, note 4.
59
[1989] S.C.J. No. 86, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 170 (S.C.C.), varg [1985] O.J. No. 2599 (Ont.
C.A.) [hereinafter “Nelles”].
60
Id., at 183, 199. See also Proulx v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2001] S.C.J. No. 65,
[2001] 3 S.C.R. 9, at para. 4 (S.C.C.), revg [1999] J.Q. no 373 (Que. C.A.); Miazga v. Kvello Estate,
[2009] S.C.J. No. 51, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 339, at paras. 56, 81 (S.C.C.), revg [2007] S.J. No. 247 (Sask.
C.A.) [hereinafter “Miazga”]; Elguzouli-Daf v. Commission of Police of the Metropolis, [1995] 1 All
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Even in tort, however, the Crown does not enjoy absolute immunity.
Immunity from civil suit could be displaced where, inter alia, the
prosecution was motivated by malice or a primary purpose other than
that of carrying the law into effect.61 The presence of malice displaced
the “qualified” immunity otherwise enjoyed by Crown Attorneys. This
high threshold prevented Crown Attorneys from becoming “enmeshed in
an avalanche of interlocutory civil proceedings and civil trials. That is a
spectre that would bode ill for the efficiency … and the quality of our
justice system.”62
In Vancouver (City) v. Ward, the Court acknowledged that a distinct
and autonomous remedy could be sought for public law or constitutional
damages. But it also recognized that claims for constitutional damages
operate concurrently with, and do not replace, the general law. As such,
private law thresholds would offer guidance for Charter remedies. As an
example, the Court expressly noted that malicious prosecution “requires
that ‘malice’ be proven because of the highly discretionary and quasijudicial role of prosecutors”.63
The Ward approach was consistent with academic writings on this
issue, which have been critical of the idea that claims for constitutional
damages should be wholly divorced from the principles and thresholds
established in private law.64 Nor has such an approach generally been
adopted in common law jurisdictions that have embraced public law

E.R. 833, [1995] Q.B. 335, at 349 (C.A.) [hereinafter, “Elguzouli-Daf”]; A. v. New South Wales
(2007), 230 C.L.R. 500, at paras. 46, 54 (H.C.A.); Commerical Union Assurance Co. of New
Zealand v. Lamont, [1989] 3 N.Z.L.R. 187, at 199 (C.A.); Imbler v. Patchman, 424 U.S. 409, at 424-29,
96 S. Ct. 984 (1976); Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, at 340-42, 129 S. Ct. 855 (2009);
Carter v. Burch, 34 F.3d 257, at 261 (4th Cir. 1994).
61
For a summary of these elements, see Miazga, id., at para. 3.
62
Elguzouli-Daf, supra, note 60, at 349.
63
Vancouver (City) v. Ward, [2010] S.C.J. No. 27, 2010 SCC 27, at para. 43 (S.C.C.), varg
[2009] B.C.J. No. 91 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Ward”]. See also id., at para. 22. Paragraph 43 also
referred to the “distinct and autonomous” thresholds for Charter liability being informed by the
“practical wisdom” of the private law.
64
See e.g., Duncan Fairgrieve, State Liability in Tort: A Comparative Law Study (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2003), at 80; Robert E. Charney & Josh Hunter, “Tort Lite? — Vancouver
(City) v. Ward and the Availability of Damages for Charter Infringements” (2011) 54 S.C.L.R. (2d)
393, at 424-25; Keith Stanton et al., Statutory Torts (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2003), at 14.024;
Geoff McLay, “Constitutional Rights: A Matter of Tort?” in Daniel Nolan & Andrew Robertson,
eds., Rights and Private Law (Oxford: Hart, 2011); Geoff McLay, “Damages for Breaches of the
New Zealand Bill of Rights — Why Aren’t They Sufficient Remedy?” (2008) N.Z.L. Rev. 333. See
also The Law Commission & The Scottish Law Commission, Damages Under the Human Rights
Act, 1998: Report on a Reference under Section 3(1)(e) of the Law Commissions Act 1965 (Law
Com. No. 266/Scot. Law. Com. No. 180) (2000).
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damages.65 A convergence of liability standards for private and public
law damages is not surprising, given that compensation, vindication and
deterrence are goals of both the private law of tort66 and Charter damage
claims.67 The two areas of the law share common underlying functions
and protect similar fundamental interests. For example, the torts of false
imprisonment and wrongful arrest and the Charter rights to liberty and
security of the person protect similar interests in liberty and freedom of
movement. Further, the law of tort damages provided a developed,
coherent and generally consistent body of principles and precedent and a
robust methodology to draw on.
In his majority decision, Moldaver J., while not adopting the high
malice threshold in tort, was also careful to not throw the baby out with
the bath water. He limited the new threshold to disclosure violations that
impaired the accused’s right to make full answer and defence:
… [A] cause of action will lie where the Crown, in breach of its
constitutional obligations, causes harm to the accused by intentionally
withholding information when it knows, or would reasonably be expected
to know, that the information is material to the defence and that the
failure to disclose will likely impinge on the accused’s ability to make
full answer and defence. This represents a high threshold for a successful
Charter damages claim, albeit one that is lower than malice.68

Justice Moldaver emphasized that this new threshold was not based
on negligence or gross negligence, stating that “a negligence-type

65
Attorney General v. Chapman, [2011] N.Z.S.C. 10, [2012] 1 N.Z.L.R. 462 (N.Z.S.C.);
Smith v. Chief Constable of Sussex Police, [2008] EWCA Civ 39, at 45, 56 (C.A.), affd, [2008]
UKHL 50, at 58 (H.L.), per Lord Bingham; D. v. East Berkshire Community Health N.H.S. Trust,
[2005] UKHL 23, at 50, [2005] 2 A.C. 373 (H.L.).
66
With respect to deterrence and compensation, see Norberg v. Wynrib, [1992] S.C.J.
No. 60, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 226, at 267-69 (S.C.C.), revg [1990] B.C.J. No. 490 (B.C.C.A.); B. (K.L.) v.
British Columbia, [2003] S.C.J. No. 51, 2003 SCC 51, at paras. 20, 26 (S.C.C.), affg [2001] B.C.J.
No. 584 (B.C.C.A.); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1995), at 3. Vindication has long been a goal of those torts that are actionable per
se, such as trespass, false imprisonment and defamation. See WIC Radio Ltd. v. Simpson, [2008]
S.C.J. No. 41, 2008 SCC 40, at para. 15 (S.C.C.), revg [2006] B.C.J. No. 1315 (B.C.C.A.); Éditions
Écosociété Inc. v. Banro Corp., [2012] S.C.J. No 18, 2012 SCC 18, at para. 30 (S.C.C.), affg [2010]
O.J. No. 2389 (Ont. C.A.). See also Jason N.E. Varuhas, “The Concept of Vindication in the Law of
Torts: Rights, Interest and Damages” (2014) 34 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 253, at 254, 267; T.R.
Hickman, “Tort Law, Public Authorities, and the Human Rights Act 1998” in Duncan Fairgrieve,
Mads Andenas & John Bell, eds., Tort Liability of Public Authorities in Comparative Perspective
(London: British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2002), at 17-22.
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Ward, supra, note 63, at para. 25.
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Henry, supra, note 4, at para. 32 (emphasis added).
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standard poses considerable problems, and ought to be rejected”.69
Certainly the first part of the threshold, that a prosecutor “knows”
information is material bespeaks a higher standard than one based on
inadvertence. However, the “or would reasonably be expected to know”
threshold looks, at first blush, like the reasonable person test used to
establish the standard of care in negligence. It would appear that, instead,
Moldaver J. was injecting a different objective standard, one arising out
of the criminal jurisprudence particular to disclosure. The material
intentionally withheld must be so obviously relevant that it falls into the
category of information that “any prosecutor, acting reasonably, should
have disclosed”.70
This high threshold recognizes the practical, on the ground and day-today realities faced by busy prosecutors in Canadian courthouses. By
imposing liability only in a situation where “any” reasonable prosecutor
would disclose, Moldaver J. was effectively reserving damages to the
clearest, or most obvious, cases. In the vast majority of cases, where the
prosecutor made an ordinary judgment call to not disclose, even one that
turned out to be mistaken, damages would not lie.
The majority’s decision is inherently practical. It recognizes that
disclosure decisions are difficult. They are rarely straightforward,
automatic or obvious.71 Disclosure decisions include a legal determination
as to what is required by the common law, statutory provisions and the
Charter itself (as part of the supreme law of Canada). The particular
context or stage of the proceeding is also germane to the information
disclosed (e.g., bail hearing, Garifoli applications, trial, and sentencing).
A complex body of case law and even conflicting decisions and legal
principles must be reviewed. These difficult prosecutorial decisions are
quasi-judicial in the sense that they apply legal standards to evidence and
are subject to, and frequently are, judicially reviewed by the trial court.72
“Relevance” in particular is often a moving target. Absent defence
disclosure, the prosecutor cannot know the defence’s theory of the case.
A prosecutor may be unaware, for example, that an accused intends to
raise an issue of racial profiling or police misconduct. Indeed, the
69

Id., at para. 74.
Id., at para. 88 (emphasis added).
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R. v. Anderson, [2014] S.C.J. No. 41, 2014 SCC 41, at para. 45 (S.C.C.), varg [2013] N.J.
No. 13 (N.L.C.A.); Krieger v. Law Society of Alberta, [2002] S.C.J. No. 45, 2002 SCC 65, [2002] 3
S.C.R. 372 (S.C.C.), revg [2000] A.J. No. 1129 (Alta. C.A.).
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Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board, [2007] S.C.J. No. 41, 2007
SCC 41, at paras. 49-50 (S.C.C.), affg [2005] O.J. No. 4045 (Ont. C.A.); Owsley v. Ontario¸ [1983]
O.J. No. 2128, 34 C.P.C. 96, at para. 15 (Ont. H.C.J.).
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accused may not choose to pursue such arguments after the Crown’s case
is completed.73 In their Report of the Review of Large and Complex
Criminal Case Procedures, Justices Patrick LeSage and Michael Code
note that there is considerable disagreement and difficulty even on the
issue of what constitutes “relevance”:
… [T]he most common problems with disclosure practices and
procedures all tend to revolve around requests for materials that are not
part of the investigation and that are at the outer edges of relevance.
The Stinchcombe test — “not … clearly irrelevant” — has been “set
quite low” and, therefore, “includes material which may have only
marginal value to the ultimate issues at trial.” Defence requests for
“marginal” materials are very difficult for the Crown to evaluate,
especially if the defence fails to particularize and explain the request.
These requests may also raise third party privacy interests when they
seek files outside of the particular investigation. 74

In addition, the Crown Attorney is under a continuing obligation75 to
reassess the issue of disclosure, often against a changing background.
Decisions made months, or even years before, will need to be revisited,
such as where the accused’s theory of the case begins to emerge. This
continuing obligation continues post-trial and throughout the appeal
process.76 Often, requests for disclosure are for material that is outside of
the investigative file. These requests can involve evidence that would be
inadmissible at the trial itself. While inadmissibility is not necessarily
synonymous with irrelevance, nevertheless the decisions as to whether a
prosecutor is constitutionally obligated to disclose this type of material
are far from obvious and often will require judicial intervention to
resolve. Accordingly, to suggest that these types of decisions are
straightforward, or unqualified, is to deny reality.77
73

See R. v. Horan, [2008] O.J. No. 3167, 2008 ONCA 589, at paras. 26-27 (Ont. C.A.).
Hon. Patrick J. LeSage & Michael Code, Report of the Review of Large and Complex
Criminal Case Procedures (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 2008), at 22.
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R. v. Girimonte, [1997] O.J. No. 4961, 121 C.C.C. (3d) 3, at paras. 41-42 (Ont. C.A.)
[hereinafter “Girimonte”].
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R. v. Trotta, [2004] O.J. No. 2439, 23 C.R. (6th), at para. 25 (Ont. C.A.), revd on other
grounds, [2007] S.C.J. No. 49, 2007 SCC 49 (S.C.C.).
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See e.g., R. v. Chaplin, [1994] S.C.J. No. 89, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 727, at paras. 21-22
(S.C.C.), affg [1993] A.J. No. 813 (Alta. C.A.) (request for any wiretap authorizations in which the
accused was named even if it was unrelated to investigation of current criminal charges); R. v. Toms,
[2003] O.J. No. 952, 174 C.C.C. (3d) 87 (Ont. C.A.), varg [2001] O.J. No. 4844 (Ont. S.C.J.)
(request for investigative files relating to the work of an undercover police agent over the previous
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Even greater complexity arises in the disclosure of information
relating to confidential informers. This privilege imposes a strict duty on
the Crown to not disclose material that is relevant but which might
identify the informant (or lead the accused to narrow the range of people
who could be the informant). Here, the consequences of getting it wrong
could be catastrophic as the life of the informant can be put in jeopardy. 78
The privilege is “nearly absolute” and will be lifted by judicial order only
when the innocence of the accused is demonstrably at stake. The
privilege itself is “a matter beyond the discretion of a trial judge.”79 The
determination of whether the privilege exists involves a judicial hearing
in which the trial judge must be satisfied on a balance of probabilities.80
Similarly, the issue of whether solicitor-client privilege is applicable
to a disclosure request, and whether that privilege is subject to an
innocence-at-stake exception, also involves the exercise of difficult
judgment calls by prosecutors which may be reviewed, and set aside, on
judicial review. Indeed, the Court has confirmed that in such applications
the trial court exercises a residual discretion to relax strict rules of
evidence in favour of the accused when necessary to prevent a
miscarriage of justice.81
Now imagine that for any one of these decisions the prosecutor makes
the wrong call. The trial court, or later an appeal court, concludes that the
prosecutor ought to have disclosed a document that he or she did not.
Faced with the prospect of Charter damages flowing from that error, and
the resulting damage to one’s reputation and good-standing, many
disclosure decisions would end up involving layers of review,
reconsideration and levels of approval by actors higher up in the Crown
apparatus. Some trials could be ground to a halt as prosecutors themselves,
out of an abundance of caution, seek judicial oversight of their disclosure
2006 MBQB 143, 9 C.R. (6th) 183 (Man. Q.B.) (records sought relating to over 200 motor vehicle
stops carried out by the arresting officer over the past two years); R. v. Dykstra, [2007] O.J.
No. 5132 (Ont. S.C.J.) (request for all police records relating to any investigations of drug smuggling
by airport employees); R. v. Gateway Industries Ltd., [2003] M.J. No. 155, 2003 MBQB 97, [2004]
6 W.W.R. 329 (Man. Q.B.) (request for prior drafts of the information to obtain the search warrant,
offers made during plea bargaining negotiations and notes of discussions with a Minister of the
Crown).
78
See Named Person v. Vancouver Sun, [2007] S.C.J. No. 43, 2007 SCC 43, at paras. 4,
101 (S.C.C.), revg [2006] B.C.J. No. 3122 (B.C.S.C.).
79
Id., at para. 19.
80
R. v. Basi, [2009] S.C.J. No. 52, 2009 SCC 52, at paras. 4, 39 (S.C.C.).
81
R. v. Brown, [2002] S.C.J. No. 35, 2002 SCC 32, at paras. 5, 116 (S.C.C.), revg [2001]
O.J. No. 3408 and 3409 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. McClure, [2001] S.C.J. No. 13, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 445, at
paras. 51-60 (S.C.C.).
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decisions in order to have the benefit (and a stronger defence) of a judge’s
prior approval should there be a subsequent civil claim.
This underscores that Moldaver J. got it right when he set the
threshold high for a claim for Charter damages for non-disclosure. To
subject Crown Attorneys to a mere causation threshold (as the dissent
suggested) or to a negligence threshold (as some of the interveners
advocated) would have influenced the day-to-day decision-making of
prosecutors and make them more defensive in their approach. Threats of
civil liability build distrust, rather than cooperation between the Crown
and defence bar. As the majority summarized:
The public interest is not well served when Crown counsel are motivated
by fear of civil liability, rather than their sworn duty to fairly and
effectively prosecute crime. By the same token, the Attorneys General
suggest that a low threshold would open up the floodgates of civil liability
and force prosecutors to spend undue amounts of time and energy
defending their conduct in court instead of performing their duties.82

Justice Moldaver categorically rejected the dissent’s claim that Crown
counsel would not be diverted from their duties, noting that with a low
threshold for liability “a detailed examination of prosecutors’ conduct is
inevitable”.83 He recognized that disclosure decisions “are invariably
difficult judgment calls” and that:
… Those difficult decisions should be motivated by legal principle, not
the fear of incurring civil liability. Furthermore, the fact that damages
claims lie against the state and not individual prosecutors does not
mitigate this concern. Like all lawyers, Crown counsel are professionals
who jealously guard their reputations and whose actions are motivated
by more than personal financial consequences. 84

Justice Moldaver’s practical acknowledgment of the importance of a
lawyer’s reputation was recognized in Hill v. Church of Scientology of
Toronto:
… The reputation of a lawyer is of paramount importance to clients, to
other members of the profession and to the judiciary. A lawyer’s
practice is founded and maintained upon the basis of a good reputation
for professional integrity and trustworthiness. It is the cornerstone of
a lawyer’s professional life. Even if endowed with outstanding talent
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and indefatigable diligence, a lawyer cannot survive without a good
reputation.85

Henry reflects the uniquely Canadian conception of access to justice
developed above. The establishment of a new threshold for Charter
damages in a non-disclosure case reflected the countervailing need to
preserve community goals of an effective criminal justice system in
which a critical actor, the state’s representative, is not derailed from his
or her duties as a Minister of Justice.

V. CONCLUSION
We have attempted to situate Kokopenace and Henry in terms of a
broader narrative concerning how the Supreme Court of Canada has
approached the concept of access to justice. In previous years, culminating
in Trial Lawyers, the Court expanded this concept to the extent that it
effectively created a constitutional right of access to justice in the superior
courts that is capable of invalidating legislation. However, in 2015 it
narrowed its understanding of access to justice. Some might thus see fit to
regard Kokopenace and Henry as missed opportunities to use the law as an
instrument to achieve social justice for many Canadians, especially
Aboriginal persons and others whose constitutional rights have been
infringed.
In our view, the Court’s retreat from its position in previous cases such as
Trial Lawyers is nevertheless based on a defensible conception of access to
social justice. This conception is realistic and pragmatic. It recognizes that
law can be used as a tool to achieve social justice but, at the same time, that
the legal system’s systemic virtue of workability must be preserved. If the
law is to function as an excellent tool to achieve any purposes at all, state
actors responsible must not have their abilities to do their jobs hampered by
onerous positive obligations or low liability thresholds. Kokopenace and
Henry preserve the law’s systemic virtue of operability to the benefit of the
community, and they reflect a distinctively Canadian approach to the
relationship between individual and communal values. A “made in Canada”
approach to access to justice recognizes that using the law as an instrument
to achieve socially just ends for aggrieved individuals must sometimes be
limited by the law’s capability to serve socially just ends for the Canadian
community as a whole.
85
Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] S.C.J. No. 64, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, at
para. 118 (S.C.C.), affg [1994] O.J. No. 961 (Ont. C.A.).

